The Fall of Assad, the Future of Syria

the war and its geopolitical consequences

As we wait to hear if Bashar al-Assad has already fled Damascus or fallen to a coup, here are a few thoughts about what might come next. Syria may well prove to be a linchpin of West Asia, as the civil war of 2012-2018 has suddenly reignited. Just two weeks after a surprise offensive in the northwest of the country by Sunni fundamentalists, all of Assad’s many enemies are sweeping the country and by tomorrow morning his regime may have definitively collapsed.

First, a really brief history:

Syria has been ruled by a Ba’athist dictatorship since 1963. Ba’athism is a political movement that combines secular Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. The only other Ba’athist state was Iraq under Saddam Hussein, though the two states were enemies at times. Nonetheless, both were antagonistic with Israel and with Sunni Muslim fundamentalist regimes and organizations, and both were ruled through military dictatorship that carried out brutal massacres against their own populations.

What was widely called the Arab Spring of 2011 turned into a revolution in Syria, where there was an outpouring of resistance to al-Assad’s rule. The factions that would eventually gain prominence are described below, but initially there was also an important anarchist component especially strong in the suburbs of Damascus, the capital, setting up local councils for autonomous, self-organized communes in Barzeh, Al-Zabadani, and Darayya, as well as the major city of Aleppo. This self-organized revolution initially involved hundreds of thousands, though brutal bombardments forced many people to flee their homes and join the flood of millions of refugees.

Omar Aziz was an organizer and theorist who participated in this revolutionary movement, though he was arrested and executed by the Syrian state in 2013. Fifth Estate published an article about him written by Leila Al Shami and with links to writings by him.

Both the Syrian government and the fundamentalists of the Islamic State were brutal in their suppression of the self-organized councils, which nonetheless lasted at least until 2016 despite receiving no outside help.

Here is a brief overview of the factions currently involved in the re-ignited Syrian civil war.

The Syrian Arab Republic: Ba’athist, as of this writing still nominally ruled by Bashar al-Assad, though it is only in control of a small percentage of the overall territory, mostly the corridor between Damascus and Homs, and the Mediterranean coast. Since the Civil War, the government has relied almost entirely on Iran, Russia, and their proxies to keep control. Its chief enemies are the Salafists, Turkey, Israel, and the US. Given the complexity of the situation, it mostly has maintained a hostile peace with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Kurdish movement.

The Syrian Democratic Forces: A coalition of military and political organizations, the largest of which are those of the Kurdish liberation movement based in Rojava (the part of Kurdistan occupied by Syria). The YPG and YPJ, Kurdish militias adherent to the revolutionary ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, were the main force in stopping the advance of the Islamic State early in the civil war, protecting an autonomous Rojava and allowing the revolutionary experience of Democratic Confederalism to have a chance to develop.

Since then, the SDF have had to rely increasingly on military and political support from the US, entering into the compromises of realpolitik, which has limited the spread and development of the Rojava revolution and its possibilities for global revolutionary solidarity. The YPG, YPJ, and Kurdish movement more broadly remain in a tension between the historically entrenched authoritarian Marxist currents that make up the old guard of the PKK and the anti-authoritarian current developed by the PKK’s leader, Öcalan, as well as the women’s organizations, local communes, and much of the younger generation.

Nonetheless, SDF controlled areas remain by far the safest for women, ethnic minorities like the Yazidi, and atheists and religious minorities.

Salafists / Islamic fundamentalists: The former term is more historically precise, the latter term is much more commonly used to refer to a hodgepodge of Sunni political and military groups from Al Qaida to the Islamic State (ISIL) and others that seek to create militarized, authoritarian theocracies that are hyper-patriarchal and generally deadly for religious minorities. In Syria, the main factions are ISIL, a few Al Qaida affiliates, and groups like HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) that have some support from Turkey. They are supported, sometimes openly but more often clandestinely, by countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. They have also received clandestine support at key moments from the United States and Israel. Their staunchest enemies are the Kurdish movement, Iran, Russia, and (when it helps to justify a war) the US.

Hizbollah: A huge Shia parastate and paramilitary organization that arose in 1982 to help defend Lebanon against the Israeli invasion. Inspired by Iran, Hizbollah represents another example of the turn away from the Marxist or nationalist independence movements of the previous generation towards authoritarian, theocratic modes of struggle that no longer perform an adherence to concepts of solidarity, global revolution, or anticapitalism. Hizbollah’s main benefactor is Iran, it maintains a strong alliance with the Assad regime in Syria (despite the latter being secular), and its main enemies are Israel and the US.

Iran: Ruled by an authoritarian theocracy that emerged from and took over a revolutionary movement against a US-backed dictatorship in the ‘70s. Its main allies in the region are the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, Ba’athist Syria (if that still exists by the time you read this), Lebanon, Hizbollah, Qatar, and important factions in Iraq, with Russia and China existing as an important economic partners and allies of convenience. Its chief enemies are Saudi Arabia, Israel, the US, and Sunni fundamentalists. Iran also has several open conflicts with Turkey, as well as a cooperative need to suppress the Kurdish freedom struggle (being two of the four countries that occupy Kurdistan).

Israel: A white supremacist settler state existing with US military support on Palestinian land. Its main internal political tensions are a simmering conflict between different rightwing and far right currents (secular and fundamentalist). Its main ally is the US, though it is far more independent and habile than a client state. It maintains a strategically ambiguous relationship with Russia, and its recent normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arabic states have decreased its isolation in the region and insulated itself from energy or investment dependence on the US. Its main enemies are the memory of Palestine and the existence of the Palestinian people, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and at a less existential level, Turkey. Israel has often played and clandestinely supported Islamic fundamentalist movements in order to curate the opposition and brand itself as a favorable alternative, though this is a risky strategy since no puppet is actually a puppet (as the US, which was instrumental to the founding and growth of Al Qaida, learned in 2001). Islamic fundamentalism, existentially, tends to require both antisemitism and a total opposition to the existence of an Israeli state.

It is a possibility that Israel’s secret services orchestrated or at least encouraged the current offensive in Syria, although it would be overly conspiratorial to assume this is the case, as both the remnants of ISIL and the Turkish-backed fundamentalist groups are perfectly capable of recognizing their own self-interest and opportune moments to act. Given Israel’s military successes against Hizbollah in Lebanon and Russia’s overextension in Ukraine and the Sahel, Assad’s regime in Syria was obviously weakened.

Turkey: Turkey under Erdogan has long been developing a nationalist, technically democratic current of Islamic fundamentalism that is governed, above all, by its geopolitical need to straddle multiple worlds and occupy strategic bridges. They are a member of NATO that has carried out numerous diplomatic and military favors for Russia, as a nominal US ally and aid recipient they are completely opposed to the Islamic State but they are the primary patron of multiple fundamentalist militias that follow the same ideology. Their ambiguity and use of proxies and gestures makes sense, as they are competing for regional influence with Greece and by extension the EU, with Russia, with Israel, with Saudi Arabia, and with Iran. Aside from the Kurds, they have few outright enemies, and also few solid, non-negotiable alliances. The SNA (Syrian National Army) is the coalition of mercenaries and fundamentalists essentially controlled by Turkey. Turkey also gives some support to more independent fundamentalist groups.

SNA fighters in Syria

Saudi Arabia: The economic powerhouse of West Asia, which finds itself in a much more vulnerable political and economic situation. Saudi Arabia is a staunch US ally and client, though that is a relationship that conveys much less power and assumes much less permanence these days than it did a decade ago. Together with the diminishing future prospects of oil as a country’s only economic asset, Saudi Arabia is in a position that requires diversifying its political and economic portfolio. Its chief enemy is Iran, which would probably overrun the Kingdom in a head-to-head war. It is a major sponsor of Sunni fundamentalist paramilitary organizations in the region. The Saudis have a growing strategic alliance with Russia, and a growing antagonism with Turkey.

Russia: The geometry of Russian imperialism has changed little throughout the last century, remaining continuous from the last decades of tsarism and the entire Soviet Union. Since ‘91, the Russian empire has lost a great deal of ground as well as losing influence across Asia and beyond. Putin’s entire legacy is an all-in crusade to restore Russian geopolitical power or die trying. That means attempting to maintain at least political control and investment opportunities in all the former S.S.R.’s (or at least the Asian ones, though Moscow probably still has plans for recovering the Baltic and, clearly, Ukraine), preventing a united Europe and a united NATO, maintaining a contentious alliance with China and at least the possibility of intervention and investment in other continents. Its relationship with Turkey involves friction but also an open door for collaboration, and it enjoys important strategic partnerships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (even though those three are currently or have been enemies). Syria has been vital to a West Asian balance of powers favorable to Russia.

The US: The US was obviously the dominant global power since World War II, but that is no longer the case, due largely to its own strategic errors. There are growing portions of the world where it can no longer impose its will, and more importantly it cannot prevent the emergence of other institutional and economic frameworks: it is still the most militarily and economically powerful single country in the world, but it is no longer the architect of the global system. Its enemies in the region include Syria and Iran; however there are no longer any significant allies the US can reliably count on.

With the reopening of the Syrian civil war and the likely collapse of the Assad regime, it may quickly become clear how much of a linchpin Syria was to a delicate political balance of power in West Asia. Since the same government ruled since 1963, many people have likely mistaken continuity for stability.

Without the current Syrian state, it is much harder for other players to compete through proxy and avoid all-out war by maintaining contradictory alliances. For starters, the speedy collapse of Assad’s military illustrate how overextended both Russia and Iran had become. Half a year ago, Iran was in a much better position: through proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, Tehran demonstrated a substantial ability to project force throughout the region. Israel had isolated itself and internal political fractures were growing. However, Israel faced no real loss of economic or military aid from Europe or the US, and then achieved significant military victories against Hizbollah in Lebanon. Iran might be ready for a direct war with Israel in a couple years, but this year, when the political context was ideal and the alliances were lined up, it was not.

Russia, meanwhile, bit off more than it can chew in Ukraine; it has lost some of the military effectiveness it had been showing in Libya, Mali, and surrounding states; and in 2021-2023 it wasn’t even able to show up for its longtime client Armenia in its wars with Azerbaijan (which at this point is much more a Turkish client than a Russian one). Given the self-defeating caution of the US and European Union, Russia may be able to claim an important partial victory in Ukraine, but its weakened interventions elsewhere in the world should not go unnoticed.

Currently, the most dynamic players in Syria are the SNA and HTS (the Turkish-backed fundamentalist groups), and the SDF, led by the Kurds but largely reliant on US military support. Israel will probably press its advantage against Hizbollah in Lebanon, preventing both them and Iran from intervening effectively in Syria. (Iran’s main alternative is to lean on allied paramilitary organizations in Iraq to open supply corridors on Syria’s eastern border, but I don’t believe that has manifested yet in a significant way.)

Israel, Russia, and Saudi Arabia all have a strong interest in preventing the spread of HTS or the installation of a Turkish-backed government in Damascus. Saudi Arabia and possibly also Israel might increase their clandestine support for ISIL or Al Qaida if they believe they can leverage them against the Turkish-backed groups of the SNA. More easily, Saudi Arabia and Israel can increase their support of the Kurdish-dominated SDF. (That would be a tougher option for Russia to choose, because it would anger Iran and aid the US proxy in Syria.) The entirety of that situation creates immense pressure for the Kurdish organizations to abandon real commitments to revolutionary change. This would provide (another) opportunity for global movements to learn that there will always be a fork in the road between democracy and revolution, but it would be much better if we didn’t have to learn from another defeat.

To sum up: unless the Syrian government makes a surprise comeback or Iran establishes an effective logistics corridor passing through Iraq, both of which are highly unlikely, the result is a much simpler bipolar conflict in Syria between the SNA and HTS, backed by Turkey, and the SDF, backed by the US and possibly Israel and Saudi Arabia. Given that the US and Turkey are both in NATO and unlikely to engage in a sustained proxy war,¹ there’s the possibility of a future Syria partitioned by the political heirs of the SNA (Turkish-backed mercenaries and Sunni fundamentalists) and the SDF (multiethnic democratic forces).

Russia and Iran both lose influence in the region. Iran will either have to concede a defeat and abandon Palestinian resistance organizations in favor of a more conservative stance, or risk open war from a less favorable position by redoubling its support for its beleaguered proxies, the Houthis, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Russia, for its part, might ease into a more cautious diplomatic approach, though given Putin’s historic approach, he might try to aggressively show up for whichever regional partner he considers most important to his endgame. I’m not betting on this outcome, but it is helpful to be aware that Russia is militarily and politically capable of tipping the scales in a way that forces an open war between Israel and its regional enemies, and that is a war that Israel would not necessarily win.

The US also potentially loses influence, depending on how things develop. One difference between Trump and Harris is that Trump is much less likely to commit US troops overseas. He is also more likely to decrease US support for Ukraine, which would make it easier for Russia to redeploy troops elsewhere.

A potential wild card in all of this, what will Egypt do? The current Egyptian military dictatorship continues to broadcast caution, even in the face of Israeli insults and violations of sovereignty agreements. The military leaders in Cairo probably do not feel like they have a strong enough foundation to risk an external war, but if they decided otherwise they could put Israel in a militarily impossible situation. I don’t see a motive for this, unless they thought such a war was inevitable and wanted to keep a future Palestine from being ruled by a government closer to Turkey or Iran.

Those are my thoughts. None of this is meant as a precise prediction, just an appraisal of some of the likely changes and the forces at work.

Of course none of these possibilities are conducive to liberation and survival. They’re just different configurations of control.

It’s important to be aware of these geopolitical conflicts because it’s the sea we swim in. It’s even more important to remember that freedom will never come from the state.

Against all borders, in solidarity with all refugees, all those who fight back against genocide without carrying out new massacres or imposing new regimes, and with undying love for all the communities that—in the face of settlers and fundamentalists and totalitarians—are growing food and trying to flourish in the desert.

Between writing this and proofreading, I found a piece published by CrimethInc. It’s written in two parts, by comrades who participated in the revolution in western Syria and anarchist comrades in Rojava, with an update written yesterday.

Also, check out this video a friend shared with me: The Gaza Ghetto Uprising

Finally, here’s a couple new things I was involved in:

Chris Browne from the Pluto Press podcast hosted a conversation between me and Vicky Osterweil, "Beyond the Ballot Box," talking about what we can learn from the past few years to better face the dangers of the next years.
RT and share!

https://www.plutobooks.com/blog/podcast-pacification-intergenerational-memory/

And I had another great conversation on The Final Straw discussing themes that show up in my two latest books, They Will Beat the Memory Out of Us and Organization, Continuity, Community.

1. A friend pointed out to me that this needs a serious clarification. Because of the direct warfare between the YPG and SDF more broadly, and either Turkey or Turkey’s allies in northern Syria, that has already occurred over the last decade, one could say there’s already a proxy war between the US and Turkey here. Here’s the difference I’m trying to communicate: currently, the Kurdish movement and the SNF (which overlap but are not the same thing) retain a high degree of political independence despite US military support. We can, however, imagine a future in which US support *and political pressure drastically increase as the Kurdish movement and the SNF are fighting for their survival against Turkey and its allies, a situation in which Turkey and the US are both openly and explicitly fighting for the direct imposition of contradictory futures on Syria. That is what I’m referring to as a sustained proxy war.