Wow I didn't see it collapsing that fast. Thanks for the update. It will be interesting (in the most fucked up ways...) to see which direction this goes in now...
Hello, I've been following it all over the last few days with friends and yes, it happened pretty damn quickly. I think that Turkey is the main actor behind this Islamist lightning victory, as they made it clear some time ago. Thank you for your assessment. Fully agree with the final paragraph.Sending regards.
Bret's opinion in today's NYT, "Syrians Also Have Israel to Thank for Their Liberation," is misguided. The liberation of oppressed peoples—whether Syrians, Palestinians, or others—is not a narrative NYT and other corporate medical have the right to rewrite. https://substack.com/home/post/p-152820610?source=queue
Thanks for this, v concise considering the content.
It's been annoying me seeing media this week shoehorning in a kind of implausible distinction between "MODERATE rebels" and the "real" islamist groups only being associated with Turkey/accidentally-on-purpose muddying the already confusing narrative of who all just overthrew Assad and why. We love the "moderate rebels" suddenly huh. (I know US support for some of these groups isn't new, but am I wrong that there's been an abrupt change in how they're covered in US media, especially since aren't some of them literally splinters off al qaida?) Just because some of the rebels are in no way associated with those currents doesn't mean it makes sense for mainstream US media to suddenly, aggressively downplay all of that context. So I'm glad you included it, and layed it out pretty clearly, even if some in your comments apparently didn't catch that.
I'm not sure Israel's involvement is all that conspiratorial. The timing is uncanny. There seems to be only one genuine winner here, only one that clearly profits, and that's Israel.
Right now IOF tanks are moving further in, past the occupied Golan Heights. And other than territorial gain in line with "Greater Israel," there's a tremendous gain in splitting the pro-Palestine movement, and the split I'm seeing right now is probably the worst since Oct '23.
My rule of thumb has always been to listen to the Palestinians, and in the same vain I'm now listening to the Syrians, only what I'm getting are opinions that are incredibly polarised. They range from celebration and seemingly genuine belief that this is a step towards liberation, even refugees talking about being able to move back, to total despair accusing people for not seeing that this is the US/Israel repeating destabilising scenarios from Iraq and Libya. Some of the biggest pro-Palestine voices are currently infighting about this, which benefits Zionism.
No one can deny that Syria under Assad had massive problems, but this doesn't feel like rectification. It feels like one set of problems has been swapped for another set of problems, and the people of Syria will be the one paying the price, as they always do.
And of course, liberation can never come from the state, what the name of the state is and what group leads it is irrelevant, the state as an entity is the issue.
One of the rules of thumb for avoiding conspiracy theory level analysis is not assuming that those who benefit were necessarily involved in organizing the thing. It inflates the power of a few actors in a way that is demobilizing and demoralizing, it treats everyone else like sheep, and it reduces the complexity of the situation. And we need to avoid conspiracy theories because of how often they play into the Right (just look at the political trajectory of the 9-11 Truthers, who appeared on the scene as critics of the State at a time when that was not a common ploy by the Alt Right like it is now).
Also, governments--especially far Right governments--often act in ways that hurt their self-interest because of how warped their worldviews become.
I would say Turkey has benefited much more from this offensive, and they have a much more documented operational-level coordination with the SNA and even HTS than Israel does with Islamic fundamentalist groups.
Fair play, you're right. Good parallel with 9/11 Truthers too and I agree regarding Turkey. I think I'm now almost hypervigilant and overreactive at the slightest mention of Israel, and it might have coloured my comment.
(I also want to say I agree that Israel is benefiting from this and will have a lot of chances to increase who this benefits them--- and that Assad is terrible but some of the new regimes that have a good chance of taking hold might be just as bad)
Yeah this was a bad take by Peter. We know for sure that ISIS gets resourcing and intel from Israel, it’s been reported a lot over the years. We know even health treatments were given to ISIS, Netanyahu showed up for a photo op to one of them.
Or maybe a bad read. I acknowledge Israeli support for fundamentalist groups. The US and UK also have documented support for such groups. Does that mean you believe the UK coordinated this offensive?
And do you believe, then, for example, that 9-11 was an inside job?
I think I took it more as caution than a bad take, it's not easy to make any comment on this situation writing from the West when things are very volatile and several sides have strong feelings about different aspects of this. But yes, we have so many documented cases of Israel's and Mossad's interference, nothing seems far fetched. If they didn't orchestrate everything, at the very least they ensured they would profit handsomely!
This truly feels like one of those rare moments when multiple things are true, I hear many Syrians' joy and hope, I just fear in how much blood will the road to a better future be drenched. *Whatever* happens next, whatever the level of US and Israeli involvement, it will have huge repercussions for MENA and the entire world.
It's disappointing to see Syrian revolutionaries themselves not really included as an actor in this analysis, let alone centred. So many discussions about the conflict in Syria focus on geopolitics. And while that's an important dimension to be aware of, there is so much that is lost in this analytical framework. Particularly for anarchists who don't accept states and paramilitary factions as the agents of history.
It's also pretty disappointing, and frankly surprising, to see all the non-SDF-aligned armed actors in the country reduced to the category of 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'. And then to see them all used interchangeably, as if they're all the same. And the implicit suggestion that the staunchest enemies of all armed anti-Assad fighters are 'Kurds', rather than the regime itself. There's obviously a strong Islamist influence over much of the rebel groups that are still standing, and that's a serious problem, but to say that they are all essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS is inaccurate, and reproduces both ethno-sectarian divisions, and racist War on Terror style discourse.
I get that this is mainly a primer about the regional political dynamics, and an effort to figure out what will come next. But at a time when we're seeing thousands of prisoners released from some of the most notorious prisons in the world, and millions of refugees (including thousands of former active participants in the Syrian revolution) returning to the country to start to rebuild Syrian civil society and (hopefully) the local councils that Omar Aziz helped introduce, that fact should really warrant more than a cursory mention. It should be pretty central to anarchist analysis around Syria, IMO.
I'm struggling to understand how you arrived at this interpretation. You say "Syrian revolutionaries are not really included as an actor" which is not really true, given that the second actor/faction I name is "The Syrian Democratic Forces: A coalition of military and political organizations, the largest of which are those of the Kurdish liberation movement based in Rojava".
This following claim of yours is just bad reading: "all the non-SDF-aligned armed actors in the country reduced to the category of 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'. And then to see them all used interchangeably, as if they're all the same". From the get-go I describe them as a "hodgepodge," I describe some of the differences, I name "coalitions" that include mercenaries and fundamentalists, and I never say that all non-SDF actors are fundamentalists, I never "say that they are all essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS is inaccurate". Are you coming at this in bad faith or were you just really angry and skipping entire paragraphs?
I don't understand this sentence you wrote, could you help me with this one?
"And the implicit suggestion that the staunchest enemies of all armed anti-Assad fighters are 'Kurds', rather than the regime itself."
I also very much support and put my hopes in Syrian revolutionaries and the rebirth of localized councils. That's why I gave that recent historical experience a prominent mention. But as I stated in the text: "Of course none of these possibilities are conducive to liberation and survival. They’re just different configurations of control.
"It’s important to be aware of these geopolitical conflicts because it’s the sea we swim in. It’s even more important to remember that freedom will never come from the state."
This text isn't about revolutionary strategy in that situation. It's about the geopolitical context that will affect those strategies. For reading on strategy, I included links to articles *written by people from Syria,* which you seem to have missed.
What I have heard from Syrian revolutionaries is that most of their movement is either in exile, in prison, or up until now keeping their heads down. I have not heard any of them claim outside the SDF claim to be a major factor in the sudden collapses of the Assad regime. So far, what I understand the main work of those folks who are still in the country and taking action, it's starting urgent structures for survival, self-defense, and coordination in some towns and cities--where state power has *already collapsed--before new authoritarian forces can get entrenched.
It took a lot of time to give a clear, good faith response to your misinterpretations. Next time, instead of contributing to all the (legitimate) stress and the (bullshit) hostility on the internet, could you either make sure you read something carefully before commenting on it, or underline the things I actually do write that are unclear or prone to misinterpretation?
Sorry if my message came off as hostile, or added to your stress... definitely wasn't my intention. In hindsight, I should have tempered my criticism by saying there's plenty in the article that I appreciated and fully agree with. Particularly the broader geopolitics, which was, as you say, the main focus of the article, and which was on point, as usual.
To clarify a few things....
When I said 'Syrian revolutionaries' I was using the term broadly to describe self-identified partisans of the Syrian Revolution. Including the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people who have organized, demonstrated and fought under its banner/flag, and are celebrating now in its name. In other words, I meant something politically distinct from the Kurdish nationalist aspirations of the PYD in Rojava, or the democratic confederalism of the broader SDF-controlled DAANES region. My point was that this great mass of people, who have gone through a gruelling revolutionary process and are celebrating what they see as a victory of that revolution, are going to be an important factor moving forward (even if not necessarily a discrete armed faction in a civil war), and I was disappointed that they weren't really included in the overall calculus.
As for the painting all armed groups as 'essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS'... reading over the text again, you're right that I seem to have misinterpreted what you wrote. Because you asked me to underline the things that were unclear or prone to misinterpretation: at one point you discussed Israel's possible involvement, and seemed to refer to the groups conducting the current offensive as 'remnants of ISIL or Turkish-backed fundamentalist groups'. And then in the section about Turkey you say that many of the groups they back 'share an ideology with ISIL'. You're right, though, that not the same as saying all the rebel factions are the same as AQ & ISIS. Happy to be wrong there.
As for my comment about all the non-SDF armed groups being reduced to 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'... that's because, aside from the SAA and the SDF, it's the only other category of Syrians on the list. And their enemies were listed as 'the Kurdish movement, Iran, Russia, and (when it helps to justify a war) the US", which seemed misplaced to me, given the main thing that seems to connect most of the hundreds of armed Sunni groups (aside from the SNA and ISIL) is their shared animosity towards Assad. Again, maybe a projection on my part, or an unfair reading of what you wrote. I'm not sure if the hodgepodge you described was meant to include the various FSA fighters in the south, or the rebels from Idlib and Aleppo who fought in a coalition alongside HTS, but who aren't Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists, or the local fighters who liberated cities like Daraa and Sweida, and towns in the Homs countryside, etc. Based on your reaction, I'm guessing this was just an omission. But as a supporter of the Syrian Revolution, I'm sure you're well aware that all armed opposition to Assad has been written off for years as 'head-chopping jihadis', so I hope you can see where I'm coming from.
Anyway, sorry if you felt attacked by my comment. I've clearly spent far too much time debating campists and tankies about Syria online, and need to learn to reign it in when I'm offering constructive feedback to people whose positions I respect.
I really appreciate those clarifications and agree with you on a lot of this. Mostly I felt able to write an analysis of the groups (overwhelmingly statist and major power-backed factions) that were the main direct causes of the collapse and the most likely to inherit or take over the power of the Assad regime, and not at all capable of any analysis of the surviving/returning revolutionary movement. That second analysis, the one I didn't write, is of course the more important analysis, and that's why I included a few links for people to read about it, in texts written by direct participants.
And I'm very much hoping those movements continue to grow and that those of us who are far away find ways to support them!
Palestine will be annihilated. Rojava has attacked the Syrian state alongside A Q and its affiliates; however bad, Syria gave a trickle of support against Palestinian genocide and prevented Israel from certain strategic victories. Golan Heights has already fallen as a direct consequence. Rojava sold out Palestine and should be criticized forever more for doing so
The Syrian regime has slaughtered thousands of Palestinians. The regime's atrocities in Yarmouk, once the largest Palestinian refugee camp outside of the Occupied Territories, are on par with the worst atrocities that Israel has carried out in Gaza.
Well, I guess it became official while I was proofreading:
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-rebels-celebrate-captured-homs-set-sights-damascus-2024-12-07/
Wow I didn't see it collapsing that fast. Thanks for the update. It will be interesting (in the most fucked up ways...) to see which direction this goes in now...
Hello, I've been following it all over the last few days with friends and yes, it happened pretty damn quickly. I think that Turkey is the main actor behind this Islamist lightning victory, as they made it clear some time ago. Thank you for your assessment. Fully agree with the final paragraph.Sending regards.
Ugh😞 This doesn't bode well for humanity.
So appreciate you sharing your important observations in such bleak times. Abrazos
Bret's opinion in today's NYT, "Syrians Also Have Israel to Thank for Their Liberation," is misguided. The liberation of oppressed peoples—whether Syrians, Palestinians, or others—is not a narrative NYT and other corporate medical have the right to rewrite. https://substack.com/home/post/p-152820610?source=queue
Thanks for this, v concise considering the content.
It's been annoying me seeing media this week shoehorning in a kind of implausible distinction between "MODERATE rebels" and the "real" islamist groups only being associated with Turkey/accidentally-on-purpose muddying the already confusing narrative of who all just overthrew Assad and why. We love the "moderate rebels" suddenly huh. (I know US support for some of these groups isn't new, but am I wrong that there's been an abrupt change in how they're covered in US media, especially since aren't some of them literally splinters off al qaida?) Just because some of the rebels are in no way associated with those currents doesn't mean it makes sense for mainstream US media to suddenly, aggressively downplay all of that context. So I'm glad you included it, and layed it out pretty clearly, even if some in your comments apparently didn't catch that.
I'm not sure Israel's involvement is all that conspiratorial. The timing is uncanny. There seems to be only one genuine winner here, only one that clearly profits, and that's Israel.
Right now IOF tanks are moving further in, past the occupied Golan Heights. And other than territorial gain in line with "Greater Israel," there's a tremendous gain in splitting the pro-Palestine movement, and the split I'm seeing right now is probably the worst since Oct '23.
My rule of thumb has always been to listen to the Palestinians, and in the same vain I'm now listening to the Syrians, only what I'm getting are opinions that are incredibly polarised. They range from celebration and seemingly genuine belief that this is a step towards liberation, even refugees talking about being able to move back, to total despair accusing people for not seeing that this is the US/Israel repeating destabilising scenarios from Iraq and Libya. Some of the biggest pro-Palestine voices are currently infighting about this, which benefits Zionism.
No one can deny that Syria under Assad had massive problems, but this doesn't feel like rectification. It feels like one set of problems has been swapped for another set of problems, and the people of Syria will be the one paying the price, as they always do.
And of course, liberation can never come from the state, what the name of the state is and what group leads it is irrelevant, the state as an entity is the issue.
One of the rules of thumb for avoiding conspiracy theory level analysis is not assuming that those who benefit were necessarily involved in organizing the thing. It inflates the power of a few actors in a way that is demobilizing and demoralizing, it treats everyone else like sheep, and it reduces the complexity of the situation. And we need to avoid conspiracy theories because of how often they play into the Right (just look at the political trajectory of the 9-11 Truthers, who appeared on the scene as critics of the State at a time when that was not a common ploy by the Alt Right like it is now).
Also, governments--especially far Right governments--often act in ways that hurt their self-interest because of how warped their worldviews become.
I would say Turkey has benefited much more from this offensive, and they have a much more documented operational-level coordination with the SNA and even HTS than Israel does with Islamic fundamentalist groups.
Fair play, you're right. Good parallel with 9/11 Truthers too and I agree regarding Turkey. I think I'm now almost hypervigilant and overreactive at the slightest mention of Israel, and it might have coloured my comment.
(I also want to say I agree that Israel is benefiting from this and will have a lot of chances to increase who this benefits them--- and that Assad is terrible but some of the new regimes that have a good chance of taking hold might be just as bad)
Yeah this was a bad take by Peter. We know for sure that ISIS gets resourcing and intel from Israel, it’s been reported a lot over the years. We know even health treatments were given to ISIS, Netanyahu showed up for a photo op to one of them.
Or maybe a bad read. I acknowledge Israeli support for fundamentalist groups. The US and UK also have documented support for such groups. Does that mean you believe the UK coordinated this offensive?
And do you believe, then, for example, that 9-11 was an inside job?
I think I took it more as caution than a bad take, it's not easy to make any comment on this situation writing from the West when things are very volatile and several sides have strong feelings about different aspects of this. But yes, we have so many documented cases of Israel's and Mossad's interference, nothing seems far fetched. If they didn't orchestrate everything, at the very least they ensured they would profit handsomely!
This truly feels like one of those rare moments when multiple things are true, I hear many Syrians' joy and hope, I just fear in how much blood will the road to a better future be drenched. *Whatever* happens next, whatever the level of US and Israeli involvement, it will have huge repercussions for MENA and the entire world.
It's disappointing to see Syrian revolutionaries themselves not really included as an actor in this analysis, let alone centred. So many discussions about the conflict in Syria focus on geopolitics. And while that's an important dimension to be aware of, there is so much that is lost in this analytical framework. Particularly for anarchists who don't accept states and paramilitary factions as the agents of history.
It's also pretty disappointing, and frankly surprising, to see all the non-SDF-aligned armed actors in the country reduced to the category of 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'. And then to see them all used interchangeably, as if they're all the same. And the implicit suggestion that the staunchest enemies of all armed anti-Assad fighters are 'Kurds', rather than the regime itself. There's obviously a strong Islamist influence over much of the rebel groups that are still standing, and that's a serious problem, but to say that they are all essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS is inaccurate, and reproduces both ethno-sectarian divisions, and racist War on Terror style discourse.
I get that this is mainly a primer about the regional political dynamics, and an effort to figure out what will come next. But at a time when we're seeing thousands of prisoners released from some of the most notorious prisons in the world, and millions of refugees (including thousands of former active participants in the Syrian revolution) returning to the country to start to rebuild Syrian civil society and (hopefully) the local councils that Omar Aziz helped introduce, that fact should really warrant more than a cursory mention. It should be pretty central to anarchist analysis around Syria, IMO.
I'm struggling to understand how you arrived at this interpretation. You say "Syrian revolutionaries are not really included as an actor" which is not really true, given that the second actor/faction I name is "The Syrian Democratic Forces: A coalition of military and political organizations, the largest of which are those of the Kurdish liberation movement based in Rojava".
This following claim of yours is just bad reading: "all the non-SDF-aligned armed actors in the country reduced to the category of 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'. And then to see them all used interchangeably, as if they're all the same". From the get-go I describe them as a "hodgepodge," I describe some of the differences, I name "coalitions" that include mercenaries and fundamentalists, and I never say that all non-SDF actors are fundamentalists, I never "say that they are all essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS is inaccurate". Are you coming at this in bad faith or were you just really angry and skipping entire paragraphs?
I don't understand this sentence you wrote, could you help me with this one?
"And the implicit suggestion that the staunchest enemies of all armed anti-Assad fighters are 'Kurds', rather than the regime itself."
I also very much support and put my hopes in Syrian revolutionaries and the rebirth of localized councils. That's why I gave that recent historical experience a prominent mention. But as I stated in the text: "Of course none of these possibilities are conducive to liberation and survival. They’re just different configurations of control.
"It’s important to be aware of these geopolitical conflicts because it’s the sea we swim in. It’s even more important to remember that freedom will never come from the state."
This text isn't about revolutionary strategy in that situation. It's about the geopolitical context that will affect those strategies. For reading on strategy, I included links to articles *written by people from Syria,* which you seem to have missed.
What I have heard from Syrian revolutionaries is that most of their movement is either in exile, in prison, or up until now keeping their heads down. I have not heard any of them claim outside the SDF claim to be a major factor in the sudden collapses of the Assad regime. So far, what I understand the main work of those folks who are still in the country and taking action, it's starting urgent structures for survival, self-defense, and coordination in some towns and cities--where state power has *already collapsed--before new authoritarian forces can get entrenched.
It took a lot of time to give a clear, good faith response to your misinterpretations. Next time, instead of contributing to all the (legitimate) stress and the (bullshit) hostility on the internet, could you either make sure you read something carefully before commenting on it, or underline the things I actually do write that are unclear or prone to misinterpretation?
Sorry if my message came off as hostile, or added to your stress... definitely wasn't my intention. In hindsight, I should have tempered my criticism by saying there's plenty in the article that I appreciated and fully agree with. Particularly the broader geopolitics, which was, as you say, the main focus of the article, and which was on point, as usual.
To clarify a few things....
When I said 'Syrian revolutionaries' I was using the term broadly to describe self-identified partisans of the Syrian Revolution. Including the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people who have organized, demonstrated and fought under its banner/flag, and are celebrating now in its name. In other words, I meant something politically distinct from the Kurdish nationalist aspirations of the PYD in Rojava, or the democratic confederalism of the broader SDF-controlled DAANES region. My point was that this great mass of people, who have gone through a gruelling revolutionary process and are celebrating what they see as a victory of that revolution, are going to be an important factor moving forward (even if not necessarily a discrete armed faction in a civil war), and I was disappointed that they weren't really included in the overall calculus.
As for the painting all armed groups as 'essentially Al Qaeda or ISIS'... reading over the text again, you're right that I seem to have misinterpreted what you wrote. Because you asked me to underline the things that were unclear or prone to misinterpretation: at one point you discussed Israel's possible involvement, and seemed to refer to the groups conducting the current offensive as 'remnants of ISIL or Turkish-backed fundamentalist groups'. And then in the section about Turkey you say that many of the groups they back 'share an ideology with ISIL'. You're right, though, that not the same as saying all the rebel factions are the same as AQ & ISIS. Happy to be wrong there.
As for my comment about all the non-SDF armed groups being reduced to 'Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists'... that's because, aside from the SAA and the SDF, it's the only other category of Syrians on the list. And their enemies were listed as 'the Kurdish movement, Iran, Russia, and (when it helps to justify a war) the US", which seemed misplaced to me, given the main thing that seems to connect most of the hundreds of armed Sunni groups (aside from the SNA and ISIL) is their shared animosity towards Assad. Again, maybe a projection on my part, or an unfair reading of what you wrote. I'm not sure if the hodgepodge you described was meant to include the various FSA fighters in the south, or the rebels from Idlib and Aleppo who fought in a coalition alongside HTS, but who aren't Salafists/Islamic Fundamentalists, or the local fighters who liberated cities like Daraa and Sweida, and towns in the Homs countryside, etc. Based on your reaction, I'm guessing this was just an omission. But as a supporter of the Syrian Revolution, I'm sure you're well aware that all armed opposition to Assad has been written off for years as 'head-chopping jihadis', so I hope you can see where I'm coming from.
Anyway, sorry if you felt attacked by my comment. I've clearly spent far too much time debating campists and tankies about Syria online, and need to learn to reign it in when I'm offering constructive feedback to people whose positions I respect.
I really appreciate those clarifications and agree with you on a lot of this. Mostly I felt able to write an analysis of the groups (overwhelmingly statist and major power-backed factions) that were the main direct causes of the collapse and the most likely to inherit or take over the power of the Assad regime, and not at all capable of any analysis of the surviving/returning revolutionary movement. That second analysis, the one I didn't write, is of course the more important analysis, and that's why I included a few links for people to read about it, in texts written by direct participants.
And I'm very much hoping those movements continue to grow and that those of us who are far away find ways to support them!
Palestine will be annihilated. Rojava has attacked the Syrian state alongside A Q and its affiliates; however bad, Syria gave a trickle of support against Palestinian genocide and prevented Israel from certain strategic victories. Golan Heights has already fallen as a direct consequence. Rojava sold out Palestine and should be criticized forever more for doing so
The Syrian regime has slaughtered thousands of Palestinians. The regime's atrocities in Yarmouk, once the largest Palestinian refugee camp outside of the Occupied Territories, are on par with the worst atrocities that Israel has carried out in Gaza.